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Abstract—Differential privacy is a formal mathematical stand-
ard for quantifying the degree of that individual privacy in a sta-
tistical database is preserved. To guarantee differential privacy,
a typical method is adding random noise to the original data
for data release. In this paper, we investigate the conditions of
differential privacy considering the general random noise adding
mechanism, and then apply the obtained results for privacy anal-
ysis of the privacy-preserving consensus algorithm. Specifically,
we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition of -differential
privacy, and the sufficient conditions of (, δ)-differential privacy.
We apply them to analyze various random noises. For the special
cases with known results, our theory matches with the literature;
for other cases that are unknown, our approach provides a simple
and effective tool for differential privacy analysis. Applying the
obtained theory, on privacy-preserving consensus algorithms, it
is proved that the average consensus and -differential privacy
cannot be guaranteed simultaneously by any privacy-preserving
consensus algorithm.
Index Terms—Random mechanism, Noise adding process,
Average consensus, Differential privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy, a famous and widely used privacy
concept, aims to minimize the chances of identifying a single
record in a release of a large database [2]. Differential privacy
means that the presence or absence of any individual record
in the database will not affect the statistics significantly [3].
Thus, the adversary has a low chance to identify the individ-
ual’s record with the released information and any auxiliary
information under differential privacy. Differential privacy has
been a formal framework to quantify the degree of that the
individual privacy is preserved while releasing useful statistical
information about the database [3]. We refer the readers to [4],
[5] by Dwork et al. for the detailed introduction of differential
privacy, including the motivation, background, the important
developments of its theories and applications. More recently,
Cortes et al. [6] introduced a system and control perspective
on the topic of privacy-preserving data analysis, showing the
importance of differential privacy in network and control area.
There are two kinds of differential privacy concepts which
have been widely investigated in the literature. The first is
-differential privacy. The parameter  expresses the privacy
cost, and a smaller value of  can guarantee a stronger privacy.
Based on -differential privacy, an adversary cannot gain sig-
nificant information about the data function of any individual
agent based on the observation of the data output. The typical
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approach to preserving -differential privacy is adding random
noise to original data for information release. Recently, Geng
and Viswanath [3] showed that when the adding random
noise follows a staircase distribution, the optimal -differential
privacy can be guaranteed in terms of a general utility-based
framework formulated by the authors. The second is (, δ)-
differential privacy, which is a relaxed notion of privacy. In
this privacy definition, the parameter  represents the privacy
cost and δ represents the probability of violating the privacy
cost. For both parameters, smaller values correspond to higher
privacy [10]. To ensure (, δ)-differential privacy, a often-used
approach is adding Gaussian noise to the pure data value for
query output.
Although random noise adding mechanism has been widely-
used, how to design and analyze the effectiveness of various
types of noises remains a challenge. Existing work mostly fo-
cused on a few well-known noise distributions (e.g., Laplacian
and Gaussian). To fill this gap, in this paper, we first investigate
the basic conditions for the random noise adding mechanism,
under which differential privacy can be guaranteed. We then
obtain the conditions to determine whether the differential
privacy is guaranteed by the noise adding mechanism. To show
this statement, we analyze the well-known noise adding mech-
anisms, e.g., Laplacian and Gaussian. For the special cases
with known results, our theory matches with the literature; for
other cases that are unknown, our approach provides a simple
and effective tool for differential privacy analysis. In addition,
we apply the theory to analyze the privacy of the privacy-
preserving consensus algorithms, a hot topic in the control
and optimization area recently. The main contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows.
1) We investigate the conditions of a general random
noise adding mechanism to guarantee differential pri-
vacy. We obtain a necessary and sufficient condition
of -differential privacy, and the sufficient conditions
of (, δ)-differential privacy. Meanwhile, we provide the
estimation of the upper bounds of  and σ, respectively.
2) We show that the obtained theory provides an effi-
cient and simple approach for the analysis of both
-differential privacy and (, δ)-differential privacy.
Specifically, using the obtained results, we prove that
Laplacian noise is -differential private, and Gaussian
noise is (, δ)-differential private, and uniform noise is
(0, δ)-differential private, consistent with the claims in
the existing works.
3) We apply the theorems of differential privacy to analyze
the privacy of general privacy-preserving consensus al-
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2gorithm. We obtain the necessary condition and the suffi-
cient condition for the algorithm under which differential
privacy is achieved. We prove that it is impossible to
achieve the average consensus and -differential privacy
simultaneously.
Different from the existing work, the proposed results can be
used to the random noise adding mechanism with any noise
distributions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II formulates the problem. In Section III, we provide the basic
theoretical results of differential privacy. Section IV studies
the application on privacy-preserving consensus algorithm.
The related works are given in Section V. Conclusions are
summarized in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARY AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Preliminary
Let V = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of nodes (users). Following
[20]–[23], adjacency and differential privacy, respectively, are
defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (σ-adjacency): Given σ ∈ R+, the state
vector x and y are σ-adjacent if, for some i0 ∈ V ,
|xi − yi| ≤
{
σ, if i = i0;
0, if i 6= i0,
(1)
for i ∈ V , where x, y ∈ Rn.
From the above definition, it follows that a pair of σ-
adjacent vectors x and y have at most one different element,
and the difference is no more than σ. For example, x = [0, 1]
and y = [1, 1] are 1-adjacent vectors.
Definition 2.2 ((, δ)-differential privacy): A randomized
mechanism A with domain Ω is (, δ)-differentially private
if, for any pair x and y (x, y ∈ Ω) of σ-adjacent state vector
and any set O ⊆ Range(A), where Range(A) is the domain
of the output under mechanism A,
Pr{A(x) ∈ O} ≤ e Pr{A(y) ∈ O}+ δ. (2)
In the above privacy definition, there are two key parame-
ters,  and δ, which represent the privacy cost and the probabil-
ity of violating the privacy cost, respectively. For both of these
parameters, smaller values offer stronger privacy guarantees. If
δ = 0, we say that A is -differentially private, which provides
a stronger privacy than (, δ)-differential privacy.
Table I summarizes a few important notations in this paper
for easy reference.
B. Problem Formulation
General Random Mechanism: We consider a general
random noise adding mechanism. Assume that the randomized
mechanism A : Ω→ Range(A) satisfies
A(x) = x+ θ, ∀ x ∈ Ω, (3)
where θ ∈ Θ is a random noise vector with fθi(z) as the PDF
of its i-th element θi, and Θ ⊆ Rn. We assume that each
fθi(z) is a continuous or sectionally continuous function, and
θi and θj are independent from each other for ∀i 6= j. Then,
TABLE I
IMPORTANT NOTATIONS
Symbol Definition
x, y a pair of σ-adjacent n dimensional vector
A a random mechanism
σ a parameter expressing the adjacency between vectors
 a parameter expressing the privacy cost
δ a parameter expressing the probability of the violating the privacy
O a subset of Range(A)
Oi the set of i-th column element of O
Range(A) the domain of the output under mechanism A
fθi (z) the probability density function of random variable θi
µ the function of Lebesgue measure
Φ0i the zero point set of the function fθi (z)
W the weight matrix in a consensus alogrithm
x¯ the average value of all node states
we have Range(A) = Ω⊕Θ, where ⊕ denotes the Minkowski
sum between two set, i.e., any element in Range(A) will equal
to the sum of two elements respectively in sets Ω and Θ.
The random mechanism A defined in (3) is a general noise
adding mechanism, where x could be substituted by a general
invertible function of x with Lipschitz condition and θ could
also be a function of random variables1.
Problem of Interests: The goal of this paper is to inves-
tigate the following two questions: i) what are the sufficient
and necessary conditions of differential privacy considering
the randomized mechanism A defined in (3); and ii) how
to extend and apply the obtained results for privacy analysis
on the privacy-preserving consensus algorithm, an important
distributed iteration algorithm in the control area. We will
solve these two problems in the following two sections,
respectively.
III. CONDITIONS OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, first, the basic conditions of differential
privacy considering A defined in (3) are obtained, followed by
the estimations of the privacy parameters. Then, we show that
the obtained conditions provide efficient criteria of differential
privacy through case studies, where the Laplacian, Gaussian,
and Uniform noises are investigated, respectively, by using the
developed theoretical results.
A. Necessary and Sufficient Condition
In this subsection, a necessary and sufficient condition of
-differentially private is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1: A is -differentially private if and only if (iff)
the following two conditions hold,
c1: zero measure of the zero-point set, i.e.,
µ
(∪ni=1Φ0i ) = 0 (4)
where Φ0i = {z|fθi(z) = 0, z ∈ R} is the zero point set
and µ(·) is the Lebesgue measure;
1 For example, we consider a more general mechanism as follows
A(x) = g(x) + h(θ), ∀ x ∈ Ω, θ ∈ Θ,
where g(x) is a function of x satisfying |g(x)− g(y)| ≤ L|x− y| (where L
is a Lipschitz constant) and g(x) 6= g(y) when x 6= y and h(θ) is a function
of θ. We can use the similar analytical approach given in this paper to analyze
differential privacy of the above mechanism.
3c2: there exists a positive constant cb such that
sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ],fθi (z)6=0
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
≤ cb, (5)
for ∀i ∈ V , where the acnodes space (isolated point) of
both fθi+σˆ and fθi(z) are not considered.
Proof: ⇐: We prove the necessity by contradiction.
First, we prove that (4) is a necessary condition. Assume
that µ
(∪ni=1Φ0i ) > 0, which means that there exists at least
one i0 ∈ V with µ
(
Φ0i0
)
> 0. Thus, there should exist an
continuous interval [a, b] such that
fθi0 (z) = 0, ∀ z ∈ [a, b], (6)
and
fθi0 (z) > 0, for z > b, (7)
or fθi0 (z) > 0 for z < a
2.
For σ-adjacent state vectors x and y, we let xi0 = yi0 − σ
and xi = yi (when i 6= i0), where σ < b−a. Then, with (3), we
have A(xi0) = xi0 + θ and A(yi0) = yi0 + θ. Define a subset
Oi0 = [yi0 +a, yi0 +b], which satisfies Oi0 ⊆ Range(A(xi0)).
From (6) and (7), it follows that
Pr{A(xi0) ∈ Oi0} =
∫ yi0+b
yi0+a
fxi0+θi0 (z)dz
=
∫ yi0+b−xi0
yi0+a−xi0
fθi0 (z)dz =
∫ b+σ
a+σ
fθi0 (z)dz
=
∫ b
a+σ
fθi0 (z)dz +
∫ b+σ
b
fθi0 (z)dz
=
∫ b+σ
b
fθi0 (z)dz > 0,
while
Pr{A(yi0) ∈ Oi0} =
∫ yi0+b
yi0+a
fyi0+θi0 (z)dz
=
∫ b
a
fθi0 (z)dz = 0.
Hence, it follows that
Pr{A(x) ∈ O}
Pr{A(y) ∈ O}
=
Pr{A(xi0) ∈ Oi0}
∏n
i=1,i6=i0 Pr{A(xi) ∈ Oi}
Pr{A(yi0) ∈ Oi0}
∏n
i=1,i6=i0 Pr{A(yi) ∈ Oi}
=
Pr{A(xi0) ∈ Oi0}
Pr{A(yi0) ∈ Oi0}
=∞, (8)
where Oi is the domain of the i-th element in O. It contradicts
to the definition of -differential privacy. Thus, one obtains that
(4) is a necessary condition if A is -differentially private.
Second, we prove that (5) is also a necessary condition.
Suppose that
sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ],fθi (z)6=0
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
=∞.
2Without loss of generality, suppose fθi (z) > 0 holds for z > b in the
following proof.
Then, for any given large constant M , there exist z0 and σˆ ∈
[−σ, σ] such that fθi(z0) 6= 0 and
fθi(z0 + σˆ)
fθi(z0)
≥M.
Since (4) holds and the measure of the acnodes is also zero, we
can ignore these two cases when we calculate the probability.
We thus can assume that fθi0 (z) is a continuous function in
a small interval among z0 and among z0 + σˆ. Then, based on
the definition of a continuous function, there exists a small
positive constant ε0 such that
max
z∈[z0,z0+ε0]
fθi0 (z) ≤ 2fθi(z0)
and
min
z∈[z0+σˆ,z0+σˆ+ε0]
fθi0 (z) ≥ (M − 1)fθi(z0).
Then, we construct a pair of σˆ-adjacent state vector x and
y with xi0 = yi0 − σˆ and xi = yi (when i 6= i0). Define the
set O0i0 = [yi0 + z0, yi0 + z0 + ε0], where ε0 ≤ σˆ. Based on
(3), we have
Pr{A(xi0) ∈ O0i0}
Pr{A(yi0) ∈ O0i0}
=
∫ yi0+z0+ε0
yi0+z0
fxi0+θi0 (z)dz∫ yi0+z0+ε0
yi0+z0
fyi0+θi0 (z)dz
=
∫ z0+σˆ+ε0
z0+σˆ
fθi0 (z)dz∫ z0+ε0
z0
fθi0 (z)dz
≥ (M − 1)fθi(z0)ε0
2fθi(z0)ε0
≥ (M − 1)
2
.
Then, similar to (8), we infer that
Pr{A(x) ∈ O}
Pr{A(y) ∈ O} ≥
(M − 1)
2
.
Note that M could be an arbitrarily large constant, which
implies that A is not -differentially private. Hence, (13) also a
necessary condition to ensure that A is -differentially private.
⇒: Next, we prove the sufficiency. Since (4) holds, the cases
that fθi(z) = 0,∀i ∈ V and the acnodes are ignored when
we calculate a probability. Let Oi be the domain/set of i-th
element in O for l = 1, ..., n. Under (3), we have
Pr{A(x) ∈ O} = Pr{x+ θ ∈ O}
= Pr{xi0 + θi0 ∈ Oi0}
n∏
i=1,i6=i0
Pr{xi + θi ∈ Oi} (9)
and
Pr{A(y) ∈ O} = Pr{y + θ ∈ O}
= Pr{yi0 + θi0 ∈ Oi0}
n∏
i=1,i6=i0
Pr{yi + θi ∈ Oi}. (10)
Since xi = yi, i 6= i0, we have
n∏
i=1,i6=i0
Pr{xi + θi ∈ Oi} =
n∏
i=1,i6=i0
Pr{yi + θi ∈ Oi}.
(11)
4Meanwhile, with the condition of c2, it follows
Pr{xi0 + θi0 ∈ Oi0} =
∮
Oi0
fxi0+θi0 (z)dz
=
∮
Oi0
fyi0−σˆ+θi0 (z)dz ≤
∮
Oi0
cbfyi0+θi0 (z)dz
= cb Pr{yi0 + θi0 ∈ Oi0}, (12)
where we have used the fact of (5). Substituting (11) and (12)
into (9) yields
Pr{A(x) ∈ O} ≤ cb Pr{A(y) ∈ O}
= elog(cb) Pr{A(y) ∈ O}
which completes the proof.
From the proof of the above theorem, it is easy to obtain the
following corollary, which provides an upper bound estimation
of the parameter  in -differential privacy.
Corollary 3.2: If conditions c1 and c2 hold, A is -
differential private, where  satisfies 0 ≤  ≤ log(cb).
Note that a smaller  provides a stronger privacy guarantee.
From the above corollary, we note that → 0 if cb → 1, i.e., a
stronger privacy can be guaranteed when cb becomes smaller.
Then, we consider a kind of random distribution which can
guarantee any small -differential private. For any cb > 1, we
construct a staircase-shaped PDF for each random variable
used to the noise adding mechanism, such that the conditions
c1 and c2 can be satisfied, which is given by
f(z) =

1− %
2a
%k, z ∈ [ka, (k + 1)a];
1− %
2a
, z ∈ [−a, a];
1− %
2a
%k, z ∈ [−ka− a,−ka],
where % ∈ (0, 1) and k is a positive integer and a is a positive
constant. A staircase-shaped PDF is shown in Fig. 2. For the
-1-2-3 321
. . . . . .
z
f(z)
Fig. 1. An example of the staircase-shaped PDF.
above staircase-shaped function f(z), we obtain that∫ +∞
−∞
f(z)dz = (1− %) + 2
∞∑
k=1
1− %
2
%k = 1,
and it thus could be a PDF function for a random variable. In
this case, when σ ≤ 1, it follows that
sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ],fθi (z)6=0
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
=
1
%
.
Note that % could be any value in (0, 1), which means that cb
could be any value in (1,∞) by setting % = 1cb . Hence, for any
small  > 0, we can find a staircase-shaped PDF for the adding
noise such that A is -differentially private. It also should be
pointed out that the staircase-shaped PDFs are proved to be
the optimal distribution for noise adding mechanism in terms
of utility-maximization [3], where the utility is a specific cost
function depending on the noise added to the query output (i.e.,
the different value of the adding noise will cause different cost
for the query output function).
Next, we provide another necessary condition and sufficient
condition of -differentially private, respectively.
Theorem 3.3: If A is -differentially private, then for ∀i ∈
V , there @ co ∈ (−∞,+∞), such that
lim
z→c0
fθi(z) = 0. (13)
Proof: Suppose that there exists a bounded constant
c0 ∈ (−∞,+∞), such that limz→c0 fθi0 (z) = 0. Since (4)
holds, we can let fθi0 (c0) = 0 and suppose that fθi0 (z) is a
continuous function in a small interval among c0. Then, there
exists an interval [c0, c1] and a small σˆ ≤ c1−c02 such that
max
z∈[c0,c0+σˆ]
fθi0 (z) ≤ ˆ(σˆ)
and
max
z∈[c0+σˆ,c1]
fθi0 (z) > ˆ(σˆ)
where ˆ(σˆ) satisfies limσˆ→0 ˆ(σˆ) = 0. Then, we construct a
pair of σˆ-adjacent state vector x and y with xi0 = yi0− σˆ and
xi = yi (when i 6= i0). Define the set Oki0 = [yi0 + c0, yi0 +
c0 + σˆ(k)], where σˆ(k) ≤ σˆ. Based on (3), we have
Pr{A(xi0) ∈ Oki0}
Pr{A(yi0) ∈ Oki0}
=
∫ yi0+c0+σˆ(k)
yi0+c0
fxi0+θi0 (z)dz∫ yi0+c0+σˆ(k)
yi0+c0
fyi0+θi0 (z)dz
=
∫ c0+σˆ+σˆ(k)
c0+σˆ
fθi0 (z)dz∫ c0+σˆ(k)
c0
fθi0 (z)dz
≥ ˆ(σˆ)σˆ(k)
ˆ(σˆ(k))σˆ(k)
≥ ˆ(σˆ)
ˆ(σˆ(k))
.
Let σˆ(k)→ 0, one obtains
lim
σˆ(k)→0
Pr{A(xi0) ∈ Oki0}
Pr{A(yi0) ∈ Oki0}
≥ lim
σˆ(k)→0
ˆ(σˆ)
ˆ(σˆ(k))
= +∞,
which implies that A is not -differentially private. It leads to
a contradiction. Thus, (13) is a necessary condition when A
is -differentially private, which completes the proof.
(13) is actually a necessary condition of c2, which can be
easily proved by contradiction. This further explains why (13)
is necessary to -differential privacy.
Theorem 3.4: A is -differentially private, if, for ∀i ∈ V ,
there exists a positive constant cb such that
sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ]
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
≤ cb. (14)
Proof: Note that if (14) can guarantee both conditions c1
and c2 to be satisfied, then this theorem can be proved from
Theorem 3.1.
First, we prove that (14) guarantees that condition c2 is sat-
isfied. By comparing (5) and (14), we note that the constraint
5fθi(z) 6= 0 in (5) is removed in (14), which means that (14)
provides a more general result than (5). Hence, one infers that
condition c2 is guaranteed by (14) directly.
Then, we prove that (14) can also guarantee condition
c1. First, suppose that c1 is not true, then there exists a
continuous interval such that fθi(z) = 0 for z in this interval.
Second, since fθi(z) is a PDF of a random variable, we have
fθi(z) ≥ 0 and
∫∞
−∞ fθi(z)dz = 1. Thus, there exists a
continuous interval such that fθi(z) > 0 holds in this interval.
Then, we further infer that there exist two continuous intervals
(a, b) and (b, c) such that fθi(z) = 0 for z ∈ (a, b) and
fθi(z) > 0 for z ∈ (b, c). It means that
sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ]
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
≥ sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ]
fθi(b+
σˆ
2 )
fθi(b− σˆ2 )
=∞, (15)
which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, we have that c1 is
also true under (14).
We thus have completed the proof.
From the above proof, we know that (14) is a stronger
condition than conditions c1 and c2. Thus, (14) is a sufficient
but not necessary condition.
B. Sufficient Condition for (, δ)-Differential Privacy
In this subsection, we study the relaxed differential privacy,
named (, δ)-differential privacy. We obtain the sufficient con-
ditions to guarantee that A provides (, δ)-differential privacy,
followed by the estimations of both the parameters  and δ.
Theorem 3.5: If (5) holds, then A is (, δ)-differentially
private, where  and δ satisfy  ≤ log(cb) and
δ ≤ max
i∈V
∮
Φ0i
fθi(z + σ)dz, (16)
respectively, and if (4) holds, we have δ = 0, i.e., A is -
differentially private.
Proof: Similarly, assume the σ-Adjacency state vectors x
and y satisfy yi0 = xi0 +σ and xi = yi, i 6= i0, and define Ol
to be the l-th column element set of O for l = 1, ..., n. Then,
we have that (9), (10) and (11) still hold true.
First, we consider the case that µ(∪i∈V Φ0i ) > 0. Given the
non-zero measure of the zero point set, (12) no longer holds
true but we can obtain the following result,
Pr{xi0 + θi0 ∈ Oi0} =
∮
Oi0
fxi0+θi0 (z)dz
=
∮
Oi0
fyi0−σ+θi0 (z)dz ≤
∮
Oi0
cbfyi0+θi0 (z)dz
+
∮
{Φ0i0+yi0}∩Oi0
fyi0−σ+θi0 (z)dz
≤ cb Pr{yi0 + θi0 ∈ Oi0}+
∮
{Φ0i0+yi0}
fyi0−σ+θi0 (z)dz
≤ cb Pr{yi0 + θi0 ∈ Oi0}+
∮
Φ0i0
fθi0 (z + σ)dz, (17)
where we have used the fact that fθi0−σ(z) = fθi0 (z + σ).
Then, one infers from (9), (10), (11) and (17) that
Pr{A(x) ∈O} =
n∏
l=1
Pr{A(xl) ∈ Ol}
= Pr{A(xi0) ∈ Oi0}
n∏
l=1,l 6=i0
Pr{A(xl) ∈ Ol}
≤ cb Pr{A(yi0) ∈ Oi0}
n∏
l=1,l 6=i0
Pr{A(yl) ∈ Ol}
+
∮
Φ0i0
fθi0 (z + σ)dz
n∏
l=1,l 6=i0
Pr{A(yl) ∈ Ol}
≤ cb Pr{A(y) ∈ O}+ max
i∈V
∮
Φ0i
fθi(z + σ)dz,
which means that A is (, δ)-differentially private.
Next, if µ(∪i∈V Φ0i ) = 0, we have that µ(Φ0i ) = 0 holds for
∀i ∈ V . Then, we obtain that
δ = max
i∈V
∮
Φ0i
fθi(z + σ)dz = 0,
i.e., A is -differentially private.
In the above theorem, note that∮
Φ0i
fθi(z + σ)dz ≤
∮
Φ0i∩{R−{Φ0i+σ}}
fθi(z + σ)dz
≤ max
Φ⊂R,µ(Φ)=µ(Φ0i∩{R−{Φ0i+σ}})
∮
Φ
fθi(z)dz.
It means that δ satisfies
δ ≤ max
Φ⊂R,µ(Φ)=µ(Φ0i∩{R−{Φ0i+σ}}),i∈V
∮
Φ
fθi(z)dz
≤ max
i∈V
[
µ(Φ0i ∩ {R− {Φ0i + σ}}) sup
z∈R
fθi(z)
]
. (18)
Meanwhile, we have
lim
σ→0
µ(Φ0i ∩ {R− {Φ0i + σ}}) = 0.
Hence, when the PDF of the adding noise is given, we have
lim
σ→0
δ = 0,
i.e., smaller σ-adjacency vectors can guarantee a smaller δ for
(, δ)-differential privacy.
From Theorem 3.5, it is known that (5) is a sufficient
condition of (, δ)-differential privacy. However, it should be
pointed out that (5) is not a necessary condition of (, δ)-
differential privacy (though it is a necessary condition of -
differential privacy). An example is Gaussian noise, which is
(, δ)-differentially private noise [3], [4], but (5) no longer
holds for Gaussian noise. The detailed analysis will be given
in the next subsection. Then, we give the other useful sufficient
condition of (, δ)-differential privacy as follows, which can be
used to prove that Gaussian noise is (, δ)-differential privacy.
Theorem 3.6: Let Θ = Θ0 ∪Θ1. Assume that∮
Θ0
fθi(z)dz ≤ δ, ∀i ∈ V (19)
6and (5) holds when θ ∈ Θ1, i.e.,
sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ],θ∈Θ1
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
≤ cb. (20)
Then, A is (, δ)-differentially private, where  ≤ log(cb).
Proof: Given any σ-adjacent state vectors x and y satis-
fying xi0 = yi0 − σ and xi = yi (when i 6= i0), we have
Pr{A(x) ∈ O} =
n∏
l=1
Pr{A(xl) ∈ Ol}
= Pr{A(xi0) ∈ Oi0}
n∏
l=1,l 6=i0
Pr{A(xl) ∈ Ol}
= [Pr{A(xi0) ∈ Oi0 |θ ∈ Θ0}+ Pr{A(xi0) ∈ Oi0 |θ ∈ Θ1}]
×
n∏
l=1,l 6=i0
Pr{A(yl) ∈ Ol}
≤ cb Pr{A(yi0) ∈ Oi0}
n∏
l=1,l 6=i0
Pr{A(yl) ∈ Ol}
+
∮
Θ0
fθi(z)dz
n∏
l=1,l 6=i0
Pr{A(yl) ∈ Ol}
≤ cb Pr{A(y) ∈ O}+ δ.
Thus, we have completed the proof.
Considering the conditions in Theorem 3.6, for any kinds
of noise random distribution, we have
lim
µ(Θ0)→µ(Θ)
∮
Θ0
fθi(z)dz = 1,
and
lim
µ(Θ1)→0
sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ],θ∈Θ1
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
= 1.
Hence, it follows from Theorem 3.6 that using any kinds of
random noise, A is (0, 1)-differentially private. This can also
be followed from the truth that
Pr{A(x) ∈ O} − Pr{A(y) ∈ O} ≤ 1
holds for any kinds of noise adding mechanism (because
0 ≤ Pr{·} ≤ 1 always holds true). Thus, it is meaningless
to consider a (0, 1)-differentially private mechanism, since
it can be satisfied by any random distributions. Note that
if Θ = Θ0(k) ∪ Θ1(k) and Θ0(k) ⊂ Θ0(k + 1), where
Θ1(∞) = Θ, then we have∮
Θ0(k)
fθi(z)dz ≤
∮
Θ0(k+1)
fθi(z)dz
≤
∮
Θ0(∞)
fθi(z)dz = 1
while
sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ],θ∈Θ1(k)
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
≥ sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ],θ∈Θ1(k+1)
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
≥ sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ],θ∈Θ1(∞)
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
= 1,
where we have used the fact that Θ1(∞) = ∅. It means that
there exists an increasing sequence δ(k) and an decreasing
sequence (k) = log(c(k)) satisfying limk→∞ δ(k) = 1
and limk→∞ (k) = 0, respectively, such that ((k), δ(k))-
differential privacy is guaranteed by A. However, it should be
pointed out that different noise distribution can guarantee the
different smallest δ and different corresponding  of (, δ)-
differential privacy. In Theorem 3.5, the estimation of the
upper bounds for δ and  can be tighten for some special dis-
tributions (e.g., uniform distribution), which will be illustrated
in the following subsection.
C. Case Studies
From the above two theorems, it is not difficult to determine
whether the added noise can guarantee the differential privacy
of a random mechanism or not. In the following, we analyze
differential privacy of some common random noises, including
Laplacian, Gaussian, and uniform distribution noise.
First, we consider the Laplacian noise adding mechanism.
Assume that the PDF is fθi(z) =
1
2be
− |z−a|b , where a and b are
two constants. We check the conditions c1 and c2, respectively.
( )
i
f z ( )if z 
( )
( )
i b
i
f z
f z
e

 

 
Fig. 2. Laplacian noise: -differentially private.
From Fig. 2, it is clear that c1 holds true due to the continuous
and non-zero of the PDF of Laplacian noise. Then, note that
for ∀σˆ ∈ [−σ, σ], we have
|fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
| =
1
2be
− |z−σˆ−a|b
1
2be
− |z−a|b
= e
|z−a|−|z−σˆ−a|
b ≤ e |σ|b .
It means that c2 condition also holds true. Hence, from The-
orem 3.1, it follows that Laplacian noise is an -differentially
private noise.
Then, we consider Gaussian noise. Assume that the PDF of
the noise is fθi(z) =
1
b
√
2pi
e−
(z−a)2
2b2 . Similarly, one infers that
c1 holds true for Gaussian noise. Note that
|fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
| =
1
b
√
2pi
e−
(z−σˆ−a)2
2b2
1
b
√
2pi
e−
(z−a)2
2b2
= e
(z−a)2−(z−σˆ−a)2
2b2
= e
σˆ(2z−σˆ−2a)
2b2 ,
which means that
sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ],fθi (z)6=0
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
≥ lim
z→∞ e
σˆ(2z−σˆ−2a)
2b2 =∞.
Hence, from Theorem 3.1, it follows that Gaussian noise is not
an -differentially private noise. However, as shown in Fig. 3,
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Fig. 3. Gaussian noise: (, δ)-differentially private.
there exists a large constant M such that  is bounded by
 ≤ ln(max e σˆ(2z−σˆ−2a)2b2 ) ≤ σ(2M − σ)
2b2
,
for z ∈ [−M,M ], and δ is bounded by
δ ≤
∮
(−∞,−M ]∪[M,∞)
fθi(z)dz
=
1
b
√
2pi
∮
(−∞,−M ]∪[M,∞)
e−
(z−a)2
2b2 dz,
which is a small value. It means that the conditions in Theorem
3.6 can be satisfied. Thus, we infer that Gaussian noise is an
(, δ)-differentially private noise.
Lastly, consider the uniform distribution noise with its PDF
as 1b−a . Clearly, c1 is not true due to the infinite measure
of the zero-point set. Hence, uniform distribution is not an
-differentially private noise. Then, we check the conditions
in Theorem 3.5. As shown in Fig. 4, it is found that for an
uniform distribution noise
sup
σˆ∈[−σ,σ],fθi (z)6=0
fθi+σˆ(z)
fθi(z)
=
1
b−a
1
b−a
= 1
and
max
i∈V
∮
Φ0i
fθi(z + σ)dz =
σ
b− a.
It means that the upper bounds of both  and δ in Theorem
3.5 are tight. Thus, one infers that uniform noise is an (, δ)-
differentially private, where  = 0 and δ = σb−a . Then, it is
S
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Fig. 4. Uniform noise: (0, δ)-differentially private.
noted that δ is a decreasing function of b− a and satisfies
lim
b−a→∞
δ = 0.
Hence, for any small δ, we can find a corresponding (0, δ)-
differentially private uniform noise. But, it should be pointed
out that when the value of b−a increases, the variance of the
uniform distribution (= (b−a)
2
12 ) increases.
The above analysis shows how to use the developed theory
to determine differential privacy of several well-known noise
distribution. Using our theory can obtain the same results for a
few special cases as those proved in the existing work, which
verifies the effectiveness of the proposed theory. In addition,
different from the previous approach, our method can deter-
mine the differential privacy of the randomized mechanism
with any fixed distribution of noise by checking the conditions,
and thus is an efficient criterion of differential privacy. For
example, we consider the following noise distribution,
fθi(z) =

z
2
e−z, z ≥ 0;
−z
2
ez, z ≤ 0.
From the definition, it is not obvious to analyze its differential
privacy directly. But, from Theorem 3.3, we easily infer that
it is not -differentially private, since fθi(0) = 0, and thus it
does not satisfy the necessary condition given in the theory.
IV. APPLICATION ON PRIVACY-PRESERVING CONSENSUS
ALGORITHM
Consensus is an efficient algorithm for distributed comput-
ing and control, which refers to the action that nodes in the
network reach a global agreement regarding a certain opinion
using their local neighbors’ information only [13]. Consensus
has been applied in a variety of areas, e.g., distributed energy
management [14], scheduling [15], and clock synchronization
[16]–[18]. Recently, the privacy-preserving consensus problem
has been studied, which aims to guarantee that the privacy of
initial state is preserved and at the same time a consensus
can still be achieved [19], [23], [25]. The basic idea is to add
random noises to the real state value during the communication
for privacy preserving, the same as (3). This motivates us to
adopt the developed theories in the above section to analyze
differential privacy of the privacy-preserving consensus algo-
rithm.
A. Privacy-preserving Consensus Algorithm
A network is abstracted by an undirected and connected
graph, G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E is
the set of the communication links (edges) between nodes.
An edge (i, j) ∈ E iff nodes i and j can communicate with
each other. Let Ni be the neighbor set of node i, defined by
Ni = {j|j ∈ V, (i, j) ∈ E, j 6= i}. Let |V | = n ≥ 3 be the
number of nodes in the network and xi(0) ∈ R be the initial
state of node i. Let x(0) = [x1(0), ...., xn(0)]T ∈ Ω0x ⊆ Rn.
General Consensus Algorithm: For a general consensus
algorithm, each node will communicate with its neighbor
nodes and update its state based on the received information
to obtain a consensus of all initial state values. The dynamic
iteration equation is given by
xi(k + 1) = wiixi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(k), (21)
8for ∀i ∈ V , which can be written in the matrix form as
x(k + 1) = Wx(k), (22)
where wii and wij are weights, and W is the weight matrix. It
is well known from [28] that, if, i) wii > 0 and wij > 0; and
ii) W is a doubly stochastic matrix, then an average consensus
can be achieved by (22), i.e.,
lim
k→∞
x(k) =
∑n
`=1 x`(0)
n
1 = x¯. (23)
Privacy-preserving Consensus (PC) Algorithm: When the
privacy of nodes’ initial states are concerned, each node may
be unwilling to release its real state to the neighbor nodes at
each iteration. To preserve the privacy of nodes’ initial states,
a widely used approach is to add a random noise to the real
state when a node needs to communicate with its neighbor
nodes [25]. Hence, we introduce a common privacy-preserving
consensus algorithm as follows:
PC :
{
x+(k) = x(k) + θ(k)
x(k + 1) = Wx+(k)
(24)
A privacy-preserving average consensus algorithm is to design
the adding noise process (including the noise distribution and
the correlations among noises in different iterations), such that
the goal of (23) is achieved under (24).
B. Privacy Conditions of Consensus
We define the input and the output sequences of each node i
in privacy-preserving consensus algorithm (24) until iteration
k as
Iinxi (k) = {xi(0), θi(0), ..., θi(k)}, (25)
and
Ioutxi (k) = {x+i (0), ..., x+i (k)}, (26)
respectively. Then, Iinx (k) = {x(0), θ(0), ..., θ(k)} is the
system input and Ioutx (k) = {x+(0), ..., x+(k)} is the system
output. Let the information set of the adding noises for node i
be Iininoise(k) = {θi(0), ..., θi(k)}. Let fθi(k)(z) be the PDF of
θi(k). Then, we have Range(PC) = Ω0x⊕Θ(0)⊕...⊕Θ(k)⊕...,
where ⊕ denotes the plus of the elements in two sets.
By referring to [23], we introduce the definition of (, δ)-
differential privacy for a consensus algorithm as follows.
Definition 4.1: A PC algorithm (24) is (, δ)-differentially
private if, for any pair x and y of σ-adjacent initial state vector
and any set O ⊆ Rn×∞,
Pr{Ioutx (∞) ∈ O} ≤ e Pr{Iouty (∞) ∈ O}+ δ. (27)
If δ = 0, we say that (24) is -differentially private.
First, we give the necessary condition of -differential
privacy for algorithm (24).
Theorem 4.2: If algorithm (24) is -differentially private,
then for ∀k ≥ 0, the random noise vector ∑kl=0W k−lθ(l)
should satisfy conditions c1 and c2.
Proof: Let On×k ⊆ Rn×k for k > 0 and On×0 ⊆ Rn
for k = 0. For any pair x and y of σ-adjacent initial state
vector, we have
Pr{Ioutx (∞) ∈ O} ≤ e Pr{Iouty (∞) ∈ O},∀O ⊆ Rn×∞
⇔Pr{Ioutx (k) ∈ On×k} ≤ e Pr{Iouty (k) ∈ On×k}, (28)
∀k ≥ 0,On×k ⊆ Rn×k
⇒Pr{x+(k) ∈ On×1} ≤ e Pr{y+(k) ∈ On×1}, (29)
∀k ≥ 0,On×k ⊆ Rn×k.
From (24), we have
x+(k) = x(k) + θ(k)
= W [x(k − 1) + θ(k − 1)] + θ(k)
= W kx(0) +
k∑
l=0
W k−lθ(l)
= x(0) + (W k − I)x(0) +
k∑
l=0
W k−lθ(l), (30)
where I is an identity matrix. From (28), (30) and Theorem
3.1, we infer that (W k − I)z + ∑kl=0W k−lθ(l), z = x, y
should satisfy conditions c1 and c2 for any σ-adjacent state
vector x and y. It follows that
∑k
l=0W
k−lθ(l) satisfies
conditions c1 and c2.
Then, we give the necessary condition of average consensus
for algorithm (24).
Theorem 4.3: Using algorithm (24), if
Pr{ lim
k→∞
x(k) = x¯} = 1, (31)
i.e., the average consensus is achieved in probability, then
Pr{ lim
k→∞
k−1∑
l=0
W k−lθ(l) = 0} = 1,
and Pr{limk→∞Wθ(k) = 0} = 1, i.e., the add noise should
equal 0 or be the 0-eigenvector of W when k →∞.
Proof: Under algorithm (24), we have
lim
k→∞
x(k) = lim
k→∞
[
W kx(0) +
k−1∑
l=0
W k−lθ(l)
]
= lim
k→∞
W kx(0) + lim
k→∞
k−1∑
l=0
W k−lθ(l)
=x¯+ lim
k→∞
k−1∑
l=0
W k−lθ(l),
where set
∑−1
l=1(·) = 0. Then, from (31), it follows that
Pr{ lim
k→∞
k−1∑
l=0
W k−lθ(l) = 0} = Pr{ lim
k→∞
[x(k)− x¯] = 0}
= 1.
Then, note that when
∑k−1
l=0 W
k−lθ(l) = 0, we have
Wθ(∞) = 0. Hence, we have Pr{limk→∞Wθ(k) = 0} = 1.
9Next, by comparing the necessary conditions of -
differential privacy and average consensus, an impossibility
result is given as follows.
Impossibility Result: From Theorem 4.3, one infers that the
added noise θ(k) should converge to 0 or the 0-eigenvector of
W , denoted by λ0, i.e., limk→∞ θ(k) = 0 or limk→∞ θ(k) =
λ0. Note that
lim
k→∞
k∑
l=0
W k−lθ(l) = lim
k→∞
[
k−1∑
l=0
W k−lθ(l) + θ(k)
]
.
Then, we have
Pr{ lim
k→∞
k∑
l=0
W k−lθ(l) = 0 or λ0} = 1.
Thus, the conditions c1 and c2 no longer hold for the added
noise
∑k
l=0W
k−lθ(l) when k → ∞. It contradicts to the
necessary condition in Theorem 4.2, and thus -differential
privacy cannot be guaranteed. It means that the necessary
condition of differential privacy and the necessary condition
of average consensus are conflicted, which leads to the impos-
sibility result. Hence, using (24), nodes cannot simultaneously
converge to the average of their initial states and preserve -
differential privacy of their initial states.
Finally, we provide the sufficient conditions of differential
privacy for algorithm (24).
Theorem 4.4: Suppose that the noise sequence
θ(1), θ(2), ..., θ(k), ...., is independent from both θ(0)
and x(0). Then, if θ(0) satisfies conditions c1 and c2,
algorithm (24) provides -differential privacy; if θ(0) satisfies
(5) or (both (19) and (20) simultaneously), algorithm (24)
provides (, δ)-differential privacy, where  ≤ log(cb) and δ
satisfies (18) or (is given by (19)).
Proof: Given any O ⊆ Rn×∞, we let Oιl be the set of
the l-th to ι-th column vectors of O for l, ι ∈ N+. Then,
Pr{Ioutx (∞) ∈ O}
= Pr{x+(0) ∈ O11}Pr{Ioutx (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |x+(0) ∈ O11}
=
∮
O11
fθ(0)(z − x) Pr{Ioutx (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
and
Pr{Iouty (∞) ∈ O}
= Pr{y+(0) ∈ O11}Pr{Iouty (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |y+(0) ∈ O11}
=
∮
O11
fθ(0)(z − y) Pr{Iouty (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
Since θ(1), θ(2), ..., θ(k), ...., are independent from both θ(0)
and x(0), for given any same vector z, we have
Pr{Ioutx (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z} = Pr{Iouty (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}.
When θ(0) satisfies conditions c1 and c2, we have∮
O11
fθ(0)(z − x) Pr{Ioutx (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
=
∮
O11
fθ(0)(z − y + σ) Pr{Ioutx (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
=
∮
O11
fθi0 (0)(zi0 − yi0 + σi0)
n∏
i=1,i6=i0
fθi(0)(zi − yi)
× Pr{Ioutx (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
≤
∮
O11
cbfθ(0)(z − y) Pr{Iouty (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz,
where σ ∈ Rn is a vector with σio = σ and all the other
elements equal to 0, which means that
Pr{Ioutx (∞) ∈ O} ≤ e Pr{Iouty (∞) ∈ O}.
Thus, (24) provides -differential privacy.
When θ(0) satisfies (5), we have∮
O11
fθ(0)(z − x) Pr{Ioutx (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
≤
∮
O11
cbfθ(0)(z − y) Pr{Iouty (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
+
∮
Oˆ11
fθ(0)(z − x) Pr{Iouty (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
≤
∮
O11
cbfθ(0)(z − y) Pr{Iouty (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
+
∮
Oˆ11
fθ(0)(z − x)dz
where Oˆ11 = {z|z ∈ O11, fθi0 (0)(zi0 − yi0) = 0, fθi0 (0)(zi0 −
xi0) 6= 0}. Let δ satisfy (18). Then, we have
Pr{Ioutx (∞) ∈ O} ≤ e Pr{Iouty (∞) ∈ O}+ δ.
Thus, (24) provides (, δ)-differential privacy.
If θ(0) satisfies both (19) and (20) simultaneously, then there
also exists Θ0 and Θ1 such that θ(0) + x satisfies (19) and
(20). Hence, we have
Pr{Ioutx (∞) ∈ O}
=
∮
O11
fθ(0)(z − x) Pr{Ioutx (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
=
∮
O11∩Θ0
fθ(0)(z − x) Pr{Ioutx (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
+
∮
O11∩Θ1
fθ(0)(z − x) Pr{Ioutx (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
≤
∮
Θ0
fθ(0)(z − x)dz
+ cb
∮
O11∩Θ1
fθ(0)(z − y) Pr{Iouty (1,∞) ∈ O∞2 |z}dz
≤δ + log(cb) Pr{Iouty (∞) ∈ O}.
It means that (24) provides (, δ)-differential privacy.
Thus, we have completes the proof.
Based on the above theoretical results, it is not difficult to
analyze differential privacy of the existing privacy-preserving
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consensus algorithm. For example, in [21], [23], the privacy-
preserving consensus algorithms are designed by adding inde-
pendent and Laplacian noise to the consensus process, and thus
the sufficient conditions in Theorem 4.4 are satisfied. Hence,
these privacy-preserving consensus algorithms proposed in
[21], [23] are -differentially private, while the exact average
consensus cannot be guaranteed by these algorithms. In [25],
the exponentially decaying and zero-sum normal noises are
adopted in the privacy-preserving consensus algorithm. Since
the sum of all added noises equals 0, the necessary condition
in Theorem 4.2 cannot be satisfied. Hence, the algorithm
proposed in [25] is not -differentially private. But it achieves
the exact average consensus in the mean-square sense.
V. RELATED WORKS
The concept of differential privacy (including -differential
privacy and (, δ)-differential privacy) was first introduced by
Dwork et al. [2], [4]. After then, differential privacy has at-
tracted substantial attention throughout computer, control and
communication science, including areas like deep learning [9],
optimization [8], [22], dynamic systems [19] and more. There
are also some other privacy definitions, e.g., identifiability and
mutual-information privacy, and we refer the readers to [29]
to view the relationship among these privacy concepts.
Dwork et al. [2] showed that the Laplacian mechanism, i.e.,
adding random noise with Laplace distribution proportional to
the global sensitivity of the query function to perturb the query
output, can preserve -differential privacy. Also, McSherry and
Talwar [11] showed the exponential mechanism can preserve
-differential privacy for general query functions. It is shown
that adding random noise with Gaussian distribution can pre-
serve the (, δ)-differential privacy for both real valued query
functions [4] and infinite dimensional query functions [12].
For the work on enforcing differential privacy in optimization,
linear programs are solved in a framework that allows for
keeping objective functions or constraints private [7]. This
work was extended by the authors of [8], and they considered
a similar setting wherein some affine objectives with linearly
constrained problems are solved while keeping the privacy of
the objective functions. To keep inputs private from an adver-
sary observing a system’s outputs, differential privacy has been
adapted to dynamical systems, which introduces the privacy
concerns in the context of systems theory [19]. Wasserman and
Zhou in [27], proposed a statistical framework for differential
privacy, where the differential privacy is investigated from a
statistical perspective.
Recently, privacy issues are concerned in multi-agent sys-
tems, and mainly investigate the privacy-preserving consensus
problem. The objective is aiming to guarantee the agents initial
states (or objective functions) private and average consensus
to be achieved [19], [21]–[25]. In [22], the authors solved
distributed consensus problems while keeping the agents’
objective functions private, and in [21] the same authors solved
similar problems while keeping the privacy of each agent’s
initial state. In these works, differential privacy is guaranteed
by adding the independently and Laplacian noises to the
consensus process. More recently, Nozari et al. [23] obtained
and proved an interesting impossibility result that achieving
average consensus and differential privacy simultaneously is
impossible by contradiction via the definition of differential
privacy. This result is also proved in this paper by comparing
the necessary conditions of differential privacy and of the
average consensus.
Different from the existing work, in this paper, we obtain a
necessary and sufficient condition of -differential privacy, and
the sufficient conditions of (, δ)-differential privacy, which
can be used to the random noise adding mechanism with any
noise distributions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we provided different conditions of differential
privacy for a generally random noise mechanism. We obtained
the conditions for determining differential privacy of random
noise mechanism, followed by an application study on privacy-
preserving consensus algorithm. Specifically, considering a
generally random noise adding mechanism, we obtained a
necessary and sufficient condition of -differential privacy, and
two useful sufficient conditions of (, δ)-differential privacy of
the noise adding mechanism. We also provided the estimations
of the upper bounds of the parameters  and δ. Then, we
showed that the obtained theory provides efficient and simple
criteria of differential privacy using case studies. In addition,
we applied the obtained result to obtain the necessary condi-
tion and the sufficient condition for the privacy-preserving con-
sensus algorithm, under which differential privacy is achieved.
There are still many open issues worth further investigation.
For example, in this paper, we focus on the privacy analysis,
and do not consider the accuracy of queries from statistical
databases under the random noise adding mechanism. How the
distribution of the adding noise affect the accuracy of queries
needs further investigation. Meanwhile, the relationship be-
tween the parameters in differential privacy ( and δ), the
parameters of the PDF of the adding noise (mean and variance)
also needs further investigation. In addition, Cuff and Yu [30]
recently introduced a novel privacy concept, named mutual-
information differential privacy (MIDP), which is sandwiched
between -differential privacy and (, δ)-differential privacy in
terms of its strength. MIDP depicts differential privacy from
the perspective of information theory. Thus, how to extend
our results under MIDP is also an interesting issue, requiring
further research.
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